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We expected that some economists would have difficulty accepting the 
analysis we presented of the South’s abandonment of self-sufliciency 
between 1860 and 1880. But we admit to being taken.by surprise by the 
argument proposed by Higgs and McGuire that it never happened. The 
claim that changes in Southern crop-choice behavior between these dates 
were “of trivial empirical consequence” is crucial to their case. This is so, 
because despite frequent references to “an alternative interpretation,” a 
“compelling interpretation,” and even a claim that these “crop choices 
were satisfactorily explained long ago,” a careful reading of their article 
will show that Higgs and McGuire advance no explanation for the 
developments which we examined. It is only the belief that no essential 
change occurred before and after the war that justifies their complete 
neglect of the antebellum evidence, a neglect with severe consequences for 
an understanding of observed behavior in historical context. 
THE ABANDONMENT OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
In 1860 the South was essentially self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs; in 
1880 it was not. The research on these matters is now so extensive that 
these statements brook no denial; certainly Higgs and McGuire offer 
n0ne.l This change, and not the cotton-corn ratio, was the basic 
motivating explicandum for our article and the development on which the 
* This paper constitutes a reply to the preceding article (“Cotton, Corn, and Risk: Another 
View,” by Robert McGuire and Robert Higgs). Our original article appeared in Journal of 
Economic History (Vol. 35 (1975), pp. 526-551). 
1 For some reason, Higgs and McGuire object to our statement that “in the leading cotton 
states, per capita corn production and the per capita stock of hogs were only about half of what 
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safety-first model focuses. Despite the availability of cotton as a profitable 
cash crop for more than 50 years, the antebellum South never abandoned 
self-sufficiency. We argued that this regional self-sufficiency reflected 
purposeful, planned self-sufficiency at the farm level; we cited the 
evidence of Gallman to this effect, and we presented evidence of 
our own that the choice of crops was a function of household consump- 
tion requirements and farm size, as one would predict on the basis 
of a safety-first self-sufficiency model (Wright and Kunreuther, 1975, pp. 
528-536).2 We supported this interpretation further by citing evidence that 
self-sufficiency was maintained even though cotton was a much more 
profitable choice at the margin: farms and plantations differing in no 
other way but crop mix show large differences in the value of output per 
worker, with cotton leading the way .3 Higgs and McGuire ignore this 
entire argument, with fatal results. Attention to historical perspective re- 
futes their statement that “many-perhaps the great majority of- 
Southern farmers always recognized heavy specialization in cotton as the 
best opportunity open to them” (our italics). Higgs and McGuire believe 
that we have confused “self-sufficiency in foodstuffs” with “the relative 
acreage of cotton and corn,” but it is they who have confused them, in 
attempting to refute a self-sufficiency argument solely by reference to 
relative crop outputs. 
Now it is quite true that the cotton-corn ratios which we presented are 
not the most illuminating indicators of the change, even as (appropriately) 
corrected by Higgs and McGuire; to this extent we bear partial 
responsibility for their misdirected discussion. Even if there had been no 
change in the ratio of cotton to corn output (a proposition with which we do 
not agree), we would still have to explain why postbellum Southern farmers 
did not respond to lower productivity and smaller farm size by growing 
primarily subsistence crops, as small, impoverished farmers did before the 
they had been twenty years earlier.” The facts are as follows: The ratio of 1880 to 1860 corn 
output per capita stood at 0.524 for the four leading cotton states of 1860,0.527 for the five 
“Old South” cotton states on which Ransom and Sutch focus, 0.531 for the seven leading 
cotton states of 1860 (which are the same as in 1880). The corresponding figures for hogs per 
capita are 0.544, 0.530, and 0.583, respectively. “About half” seems to us a reasonable 
description of these fractions. 
* Because of the absence of antebellum acreage data, these regressions used estimated 
acreage shares, derived from output data on the assumption of constant relative yields. On the 
basis of subsequent work, we can now report that the same results hold if instead we use the 
share of cotton in the total value of crop production. 
3 In a footnote, Higgs and McGuire declare this evidence “completely irrelevant,” but in 
fact it is a basic part of the argument. Obviously we do not have independent evidence on 
antebellum yield variability, but Higgs and McGuire present no other explanationfortbis crop 
differential in profitability. Perhaps it is the unusually favorable characteristics of 1859- 1860 
as a cotton year which concern them (though they seem unaware of these elsewhere in the 
article). I f  so, then it should be noted that the differential is also found (though of smaller 
magnitude) in the very poor cotton year of 1849-1850. 
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~ar.~ Why was it “unacceptably costly to do otherwise” (than abandon 
self-sufficiency) after the war but not before? Higgs and McGuire allow 
only that “transactions costs deterred them from consistently maximizing 
returns on a year-to-year basis,” and we are left to infer that they believe 
the South’s failure to abandon self-sufficiency down to 1860 can be 
satisfactorily understood as a Xl-year lag, compelled by unobserved 
“transactions costs.” They do not say this, but only because they do not 
face up to the issue. It is difficult to know what point Higgs and McGuire are 
attempting to make in stressing the superior expected earnings in cotton 
growing (the very position we defended and documented in the original 
article). They offer no explanation for the U-shape between farm size and 
cotton, nor for the correlation between cotton and tenancy, nor in par- 
ticular for the fact that the majority of medium-sized and larger farms re- 
mained self-sufficient in foodstuffs in 1880.5 
Although cotton-corn ratios are not critical to the argument they do 
have some significance. What we intended to convey was the fact that by 
1880 the ratio had come to exceed even the level of the exceptional census 
year 1860, which is known to have been an unusually good cotton year but 
is reported to have been a poor-to-medium year for corn. We included the 
1850 figure to suggest that the normal antebellum ratio was probably much 
lower than the 1860 level. A closer look shows, however, that 1850 was also 
not a typical cotton year, but one for which “the failure . . . was so great, 
that it is almost impossible to expect a like deficiency again.“6 The corn 
crop of that year, on the other hand, seems to have been normal. This 
characterization of the two census years is supported by both contempo- 
rary testimony and econometric evidence, and it is the main reason for the 
large increase in the cotton-corn ratio between 1850 and 1860.’ The 
4 Stanley Engerman reminds us that such a shift into food crops was commonly observed 
after emancipation elsewhere in the Americas, wherever the freed slaves had unhindered 
access to the land. 
5 Ransom and Sutch, 1972, p. 663. Higgs and McGuire do raise the possibility that what 
appear to be “small” sharecropping farms are actually part of much larger managerial units. 
They may be right, but they do not mention the evidence (which we cited) that cash tenancy is 
even more strongly correlated with cotton growing than sharecropping, and that the U-shaped 
pattern is present for cash renters and owner-operated farms as well. 
6 U.S. Commissioner of Patents, Annual Report for 1850, Vol. 2, p. 510. 
’ Residuals from cotton-supply-curve estimates range from + 11.6 to +23.6% in 1859- 1860, 
from -5.8 to - 19.7% in 1849- 1850(see Wright, 1975, pp. 333-334). Contemporary testimony 
may be found in the 1849 Annual Report of the Patent Commissioner, pp. 144,149, 170,307. 
and in J. L. Watkins, (1908, pp. 81, 107, 150, 197, 217,240, 258). Thorp (1926), characterizes 
1849- 1850 with the phrase “excellent crops except cotton” (p, 125), and a comparison of 
1849- 1850 output with the Patent Office estimate for 1848- 1849 shows that the corn crop rose 
by more than 5% in the seven leading cotton states (12% if Texas is excluded), while the cotton 
output figures show a decline. Concerning 1859-1860, Thorp writes “enormous cotton 
crops” (p. 217); the exceptional picking season is described in American Cotfon Planter 
(1860, pp, 163-164). On the corn crop for that year, see the citations in Gallman, 1970, p. 8. 
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argument is reinforced by reference to the only other comparable 
antebellum evidence, the state-level estimates of crop production prepared 
by the Patent Offlice during the 1840’s, which show ratios averaging above 
the 1849- 1850 level and below the 1859- 1860 level in the seven leading 
cotton states of the Deep South.E The key missing information is for the 
185Os, but if we were to regard the 1850 and 1860 ratios as having equal and 
opposite biases, and take their midpoint as an estimate for that decade, we 
would have the following pattern: 
Cotton/Corn (000 bales/OOO,OOO bushels) 
5 states 7 states 11 states 
1840s (6 obs) 26.62 24.48 10.91 
1850s (2 obs) 25.50 23.91 14.59 
1870s (10 obs) 30.99 27.38 17.22 
1880s (10 obs) 37.71 28.82 19.91 
1890s (10 obs) 37.12 32.94 18.34 
Thus, what data we have do suggest that in the Deep South the Civil War 
decade marked a watershed in terms of output proportions as well as 
self-sufficiency, though we reiterate that this is not an essential 
precondition for the applicability of our argument. It is of course perfectly 
possible that the cotton-corn ratio was in fact rising during the 185Os, and 
we do not mean to deny this. Indeed, while Higgs and McGuire offer no 
explanation for such a trend, it is precisely what our model would predict! 
because the ratio of improved acreage to population was rising throughout 
the South during this decade. As more improved acreage becomes avail. 
able above subsistence needs, we would expect cotton to get the largesl 
share of the increase. This pattern of expansion, however, would not lead 
to the abandonment of self-sufficiency, and hence the postbellurr 
experience cannot be viewed as a simple extension of antebellum trends. 
THE CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT OF RISK 
Higgs and McGuire raise a number of objections to our contention ant 
demonstration that cotton was a riskier choice than corn. Most of thesi 
objections stem from a failure to appreciate the implications of defining th’ 
decision variables in the way we did, viewing cotton growing as a means c 
8 The usefulness of these estimates is examined, with generally favorable conclusions, t 
Gallman (1%3, pp. 185-195). Note however that the corn estimates for Tennessee a 
especially suspect (p. 194) because the state did not come close to matching these levels un 
the 1890s. For this reason, and in order to exclude the areas of Tennessee, North Carolina, su 
Virginia which grew corn and raised swine commercially, we concentrate here on the states 
the Deep South, which are the same as the seven leading cotton states of 1860 and 188( 
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obtaining corn. Our variables x (cotton) and y (corn) were defined as 
follows: 
Y = yml, (2) 
where Y,, = cotton yield; Pcot = cotton price; Y,,, = corn yield; 
P,,, = corn price: D = cost differential per acre associated with growing 
cotton instead of corn. (We assumed that corn required no cash inputs.) 
The main reason for defining the variablex is to relate the variance of yields 
and prices to the subsistence target. We did not argue that cotton yields and 
prices happened to be more variable than corn yields and prices during a 
certain historical period, but that x will generally be more variable than y , 
because x involves a combination of yield risk and two kinds of 
marketplace risk. Because variances of ratios of random variables are 
analytically intractable, we chose simply to illustrate by direct calculation 
the magnitude of the riskiness differentials which were generated by this 
kind of pyramiding- not as a representation of the actual parameters of 
year-to-year decision making by farmers, but as a statistical rendition of the 
logic of the safety-first argument. It is the logic as much as the statistical 
result which prompts our confidence that antebellum relationships were 
much the same. 
With this summary as a background, we can now show the irrelevance of 
what Higgs and McGuire believe to be “the critical problem”: our neglect 
of covariance between x and y. The important feature of our argument 
which they overlook is that the major types of covariance are already 
absorbed in our definition of the variable x. If cotton yields and prices are 
inversely correlated, or if cotton and corn prices are positively correlated, 
these effects will be reflected in the measured variance ofx. The remaining 
covariance between x and y is not large, but it is definitely positive .n The 
incorporation of a positive covariance into the analysis serves to 
strengthen our position, by providing the rationale for complete 
specialization in corn by risk-averse farmers. To see this, note that the 
allocation of acreage which minimizes the overall variance (using the 
formula in Higgs and McGuire’s footnote 14) is given by 
Q* = s,2 - cov(x,y) 
s,2 + s,2 - 2 cov(x,y) ’ 
(3) 
where Q is the share of acreage in cotton,S denotes standard deviation, and 
x and y are defined as above. If we ignore the covariance and use the data in 
s The average state-level correlation coefficient is 0.35, which is to say that less than 15% of 
the variance in x is “explained” by the variance in y. 
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our Table 5, we obtain figures for Q* ranging from 2.2 to 8.2%. However, if 
we add a correlation of 0.35, expression (3) becomes negative for every 
state, which is to say that the variance is in fact minimized by planting all 
corn. Furthermore, for any Q greater than Q* (in this case for any positive 
Q,), the variance will be monotonically related to Q. lo Thus, contrary to 
Higgs and McGuire’s apparent belief that consideration of the covariance 
will completely wipe out the results, the existence of a positive covariance 
only augments the proposition that choosing cotton at the expense of 
self-sufficiency was risky. 
The lesser objections may be dealt with more briefly. While the 
appropriateness of computing the variance for each crop around a time 
trend could certainly be debated, we will not pursue the matter since 
detrending makes not the slightest dent in the results.ll As for the 
coefficient of variation (ratio of standard deviation to the mean), Higgs and 
McGuire refer to this as the “correct statistical concept,” but without 
discussion or citation. The use of the coefficient of variation is analytically 
necessary only when the two crops are measured in different units; but 
since we have defined x and y in terms of the same units (bushels of corn), 
the standard deviations can be meaningfully compared independently of 
the means. It is the standard deviation (or variance) which enters into the 
basic portfolio formulas and which is used in conventional mean- variance 
analysis.12 The use of the coefficient of variation would involve an implicit 
homogeneity restriction on the risk-return preference function. 
Despite Higgs and McGuire’s persistent efforts to push us back into a 
portfolio-balance framework, however, the real measures of risk in our 
model are the probability of falling below the target yieldZ* and the relative 
lo Using the same formula, we have dS$ dQ = 2 QSsZ - 2(1 - Q)S,* + 2 cov(x,y)(l 
- 2Q) which will be greater than zero if Q > Q* as in Eq. (3). 
I1 If  a linear trend is fitted to variables x and y, the difference between raw and detrended 



















Comparison with Table 5 in the original article will show that no conclusion is altered. (Notc 
that because of a typographical error, the standard deviations for cotton and corn for Soutl 
Carolina were reported as being identical to North Carolina’s South Carolina’s figures shoulc 
be 6.31 and 1.41, respectively. 
I2 See, for example, Fama, 1971; Fama and MacBeth, 1973. 
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costs of such a shortfall. We specifically did not argue that postbellum 
farmers “bore more risk” than antebellum farmers in the sense of facing a 
higher probability of actual starvation (p. 540). We argued instead that a 
large fraction of postbellum farmers were more willing to bear risk (pp. 528, 
539) in the sense of a higher probability of not breaking even on their food 
requirements (or a higher variance in that portion of their productive 
activity which went toward satisfying these requirements), because the 
relative costs and benefits of shortfalls and surpluses had changed, and 
because the target yields were higher. l3 We called this “gambling” because 
these risks were borne in the hopes of attaining “an exceptionally large 
payoff,” and we were at great pains to caution that this term could 
encompass several different underlying psychological perspectives on the 
part of farmers (p. 550). 
OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
In our model, the riskiness of specialization in cotton is a function of the 
options available in case of a failure to meet the subsistence target. Higgs 
and McGuire argue in essence that these risks were not serious, because 
the postbellum Southern farmer “possessed ample opportunities for 
supplementing his income outside his own farm.” It is certainly not true 
that there were literally no such opportunities, and where part-time 
employment was available the logic of crop choice would surely be 
different. But the handful of postbellum citations offered by Higgs and 
McGuire do not add up to a demonstration that off-farm employment was 
“ample,” and there is substantial testimony to the contrary. Rural 
employment opportunities were limited because of the weak development 
of commerce and manufacturing in the Southern countryside, and because 
the seasonality of labor requirements in cotton (and the lack of alternative 
cash crops) meant that agriculture could not generate wage-paying jobs 
except when the farmer’s labor was needed on his own farm. Occasional 
odd jobs around the plantation were too uncertain and irregular for farmers 
to count on them as a means of meeting subsistence requirements and debt 
payments. Of course able-bodied men could go somewhere in the South 
and expect to find work (with some probability), but these choices were 
effectively ruled out of the portfolios of most Southern farmers by what we 
may loosely call transactions costs-a category in which we would include 
not only information and distance, but the distaste for being separated from 
one’s family and for doing hard, disagreeable gang labor. Readers who look 
I3 We might have clarified the argument by distinguishing the self-sufficiency target from 
the cash constraint which many small farmers faced for the first time after the war. Most small 
farms could meet a target yield determined solely by subsistence requirements, but on a 
limited acreage they could not satisfy both of these constraints, and self-sufficiency had to 
give way, probabilistically speaking. 
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closely at Higgs and McGuire’s suggested “nonfarm employment” will 
find a list of jobs which is highly specific geographically (and largely 
peripheral to the cotton belt) and which possesses the aforementioned 
qualities in abundance. 
To support these assertions, one need go no further than Higgs and 
McGuire’s citations. They cite, for example, the testimony of Mr. L. W. 
Youmans of Fairfax, South Carolina, who ran his 1300-1400-acre 
plantation with labor hired by the day. l4 Without belaboring the fact that 
this was a rather atypical arrangement in the Cotton South, should we not 
also take note of the fact that in the prosperous 2Oth-century year of 1901, 
Mr. Youmans reported that “there is a great deal more of it [labor by the 
day] than I have any need for” (p. 117), and went on to say that his em- 
ployees “always want work. . . . They want employment. The trouble 
with me is trying to find work for them” (p. 122). Youmans described his 
“colored tenants” coming to him in winter, without food, asking for credit 
or work, and he allowed that “if I can arrange work for them I always do” 
(p. 122). This is how the tenant farmer “supplemented his income.” 
Another citation tells about a large wage-paying sugar plantation in 
Louisiana, to which “small cotton croppers” came during the grinding 
season, after the cotton harvest.15 These croppers obviously had to come 
some distance to take these day-labor jobs, and the writer states that they 
do so, “there being no other workfor them to do in the cotton section” (p. 
110; our italics). He also observes: “They very much dislike the gang 
system of labor and roam all over the country seeking job work, when they 
can work as they please” (p. 119). These were the sorts of “ample 
opportunities” which Southern tenants “commonly grasped.” Higgs and 
McGuire even cite employers’ complaints that sharecroppers abandoned 
their crops after receiving advances, or after deciding prospects were 
poor-behavior which led landlords frequently to insist on retaining 
contractual control over their tenants’ labor time.16 
The fact that small farmers could find a way to survive if they had to is in 
no way inconsistent with our model. But the kind of options which Higgs 
and McGuire document represents exactly the sort of unpleasant 
alternative which, in our view, family farmers were trying to avoid by 
maintaining or working towards farm ownership and self-sufficiency. Much 
of the economic history of the Southeast in the 20th century has recounted 
I4 Report of the U.S. Industrial Commission, 1901, Volume X,Agriculture, pp. 117-122. 
Is Laws, 1902, pp. 95-120. 
I6 Their citations are to the 1880 census, Report on Cotton Production, and to the 1885 
Senate Committee,Report on Relations between Labor and Capital. Each of these documents, 
it might be noted, contains substantial testimony on the overproduction of cotton, indicating 
that these complaints were not limited to the 1870s and 1890s. Two of the best examples are 
the statements in the U.S. Senate Report by W. H. Gardner of Alabama (pp. 75-76) and John 
Peabody of Georgia (pp. 555-557). For an example of a sharecropping contract which 
restricts labor mobility, see Taylor, 1943, pp. 122- 123. 
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the dramatic ways in which agricultural resource allocation changed when 
relatively modest wage-paying opportunities penetrated rural counties.17 
These studies generally argue that the coming of employment opportunities 
brought an increase in part-time farming, a reduction in rural under- 
employment, and little if any decline in farm output. If labor markets were so 
imperfect so late in the 20th century, can we reasonably believe they were 
better in 1880? 
INTERPRETATIONS OF HISTORY 
We conclude with some brief observations on the general methodologi- 
cal and interpretive points raised by Higgs and McGuire. They are 
skeptical of safety-first and other models which are not rooted in von 
Neumann-Morgenstem axioms of rational behavior; they object to our 
characterization of the shift into cotton as “quasi-voluntary” on the 
general grounds that “actions are no less voluntary simply because they 
are constrained”; they argue that the “abandonment of self-sufficiency” is 
quite consistent with the elementary principles of efficiency, specializa- 
tion, and comparative advantage, and hence these principles provide an 
interpretation symmetrical with the accepted analysis of developments in 
the North. For reasons already given, it is not clear exactly what Higgs and 
McGuire mean by the “orthodox choice-theoretic interpretation,“since 
they have offered no explanation for most of the phenomena we described. 
But it seems a fair statement of their position that one should adopt the 
interpretation given by elementary price theory so long as it suffices, 
moving into “unorthodox and untried” behavioral explanations only ifit is 
established that “an interpretation based on the straightforward maximiza- 
tion of expected utility is incapable of explaining the data.” This is, at any 
rate, a frequently heard view with which we disagree. 
It is not a crucial point for us whether lexicographically ordered 
preferences are consistent with the axioms of expected utility theory. We 
do not shrink from defending the propositions that in the real world 
individuals do have specific goals and objectives, that these objectives 
have different degrees of importance and priority, and that economic actors 
have computational limitations and typically follow simplified strategies, 
rules-of-thumb, or decision rules in pursuit of their goals. Substantial 
evidence has now accumulated concerning the difficulty with which 
individuals absorb and process information about choices and risks, and 
the extent to which they do rely on simplified principles to guide their 
behavior.1s Empirical evidence from the study of behavior with respect to 
low-probability events indicates that individuals frequently do not have 
I7 Tang, 1958, esp. Chap VI; Nicholls, 1961, pp. 319-340; Parker and Davies, 1962, pp. 
121-129. 
I* This evidence is summarized in Slavic, Kunreuther, and White, 1974. 
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enough information to make decisions in the manner described by 
expected-utility theory, and that those who do possess such information 
frequently behave in a manner inconsistent with expected-utility theory.ls 
We believe that incorporating these behavioral principles explicitly into 
econometric research is of positive benefit in opening the possibility of 
fruitful interaction between economists and managers, survey takers, and 
farmers (etc.), providing more and not less empirical specificity to the 
analysis. 
The methodological issue appears to be a question of the burden of proof 
between competing explanations, but we believe this to be a misleading 
description. We chose to focus on the change in self-sufficiency between 
1860 and 1880 precisely because there did not seem to be a straightforward 
explanation in conventional price theory, and our model seemed to fit the 
evidence. In the considerable amount of comment we have received on this 
article (and on related work), we have frequently been urged to show how 
our explanation is superior to an ‘ ‘orthodox” explanation. Higgs and 
McGuire are unique in claiming that there is nothing to be explained, but 
neither they nor anyone else has offered an “orthodox” explanation for the 
empirical phenomena we describe: the end of self-sufficiency between 
these dates, the change in the shape of the farm size- crop mix relationship, 
and the U-shaped pattern itself. We begin to feel we are wrestling with a 
phantom, and that it is not so much a question of burden of proof as a way of 
looking at the world. 
This is not to say that “orthodox” theory is “incapable of explaining the 
facts.” The present case is apparently something of a challenge, but 
presumably one could find a change in some incentive variable which 
favored cotton; one could compute the appropriate “response co- 
efficients” as they varied by farm size, if necessary with lags that varied by 
farm size as well; one could infer that there must have been some 
technological change in the “optimal crop mix” by farm size; or at the very 
most, one could allow that there had been some change in the shape of the 
utility function over time, perhaps a result of the aftermath of the war and 
emancipation. By devices such as these, economists have convinced 
themselves that their theoretical presuppositions have been repeatedly 
confirmed by the evidence, when in fact they have only rationalized the 
facts in terms of a particular way of viewing the world.20 
Is Kunreuther, 1976. 
*O This viewpoint is ably outlined with reference to the economists’ treatment of “tastes” by 
Foley (1975). The objection to our use of terms like “compulsion” is a case in point. Higgs and 
McGuire argue in essence that no one is ever “forced” to do any economic activity, but this 
narrow definition can hardly be the “commonly understood sense” of a term so frequently 
applied. Because they do not examine the process of change over time, they do not even 
distinguish individuals whose opportunity sets have contrncied from those whose choices 
have expanded: if an option previously exercised is closed off by a new constraint, a 
reasonable man will say that he has been “forced” into his new position. 
COTTON, CORN, AND RISKS 193 
This weltanschauung tends to produce an isolated and unhistorical 
economic history, not well integrated with the broader themes of 
traditional history nor the subtler perceptions of contemporaries. Higgs 
and McGuire ask: “Why have economic historians failed to produce a 
literature bemoaning the failure of Pennsylvania or New York or 
Massachusetts to remain self-sufficient in foodstuffs?” We are not 
responsible for what makes economic historians tick, but it is a narrow 
knowledge of history which is unaware of the parallel doubts, fears, and 
reluctance with which Northeastern farmers abandoned self-sufficiency. It 
was not a Southern reformer, but a New England farmer who urged in 
1852:21 
As a general rule, however, it is better that the farmer should produce what he 
needs for home consumption. . . . He may obtain more money from tobacco, hops 
or broom corn, than from breadstuffs, but taking all things into consideration, will 
he be better off? 
The critical strategic and class implications of “access to the means of 
subsistence” are a common theme in history generally, not just in the 
South.22 The reason why regional self-sufficiency was uniquely important 
in the South was given in our original article (pp. 544-546, 551), namely, 
that the Southern cotton crop dominated the world market, and for this 
reason the region as a whole actually lost from the shift. The reasons why 
the microeconomic issue of self-sufficiency was less prominent in the 
North are also suggested by the analysis: Northern farmers could choose 
from a greater variety of cash crops, and most of their choices were also 
basic food crops, so that they did not face as severe and as stark a choice as 
did Southerners; and in contrast to cotton, the Northern crops remained in 
strong and growing demand (with notable exceptions late in the century), 
thus ratifying and reinforcing the risky choices farmers had taken. Thus, far 
from producing an undesirably asymmetric analysis, we argue that it is a 
virtue of our approach that it provides insight into divergent patterns of 
regional behavior, attitudes, and development. 
Finally, we commend these models to the sympathetic attention of 
historical economists, because they lend themselves to interpretations in 
which history really matters, in the sense that “initial conditions” do affect 
outcomes, and the precise historical sequence of events makes a 
difference. In our view, it was critically important that the 1860s saw a 
coincidence of emancipation, cotton famine, the failure to distribute land to 
freedmen, and the onset of an era of stagnation in cotton demand. The 
absence of any of these ingredients would have altered the pattern of 
21 Plough, Loom andAnvil IV (1852), quoted in Danhof, 1969, p. 23. Danhof’s footnotes are 
misnumbered, but the pages of his book are filled with documentation for these attitudes. 
2* As surveyed in Tilly, 1975. An argument which stresses the political consequences of 
abandoning self-sufficiency in Northern agriculture appears in Mayhew, 1972. 
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subsequent development. In our view, the historical record of Southern 
agriculture does not so much trace the course of a moving equilibrium, but 
shows us instead the sequence of outcomes of some risky choices in agame 
of chance played a relatively small number of times: a game in which each 
year’s choices are constrained by the cumulative legacy of the previous 
history. Of course, our particular analysis could be wrong, and certainly it 
deserves to be looked at with the critical energy Higgs and McGuire have 
mobilized. But if we adopt the methodological position which they 
recommend, economic history will never have a distinctive contribution to 
make to the field of economics. We will remain camp followers to the 
profession, generating numbers of antiquarian interest, and cranking out 
“orthodox” interpretations which will convince economists, if they bother 
to look, that they are missing nothing essential by ignoring history.23 
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